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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-2891 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MIGUEL LAVENANT, 
                Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from United States District Court  
for the District of Delaware 
(D. Del. No. 1-12-cr-00028-002) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 20, 2015 
 
Before:  FISHER, CHAGARES, and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 21, 2015 ) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Miguel Angel Lavenant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine and three counts of money laundering in the United States District Court for the 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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District of Delaware. The District Court sentenced him to 293 months of imprisonment. 
Lavenant appeals both his conviction and sentence. We will affirm. 
I. 
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 
to our analysis. 
In November 2011, Roscoe Hall asked a source cooperating with the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) to send a truck with a hidden compartment from 
Delaware to San Diego, California, and to transport it back to Delaware. DEA agents 
provided the source with such a truck and observed the truck in San Diego. The agents 
saw Hall and Lavenant drive it to Lavenant’s house, where they loaded the truck with 
over 5 kilograms of cocaine. 
When Hall arrived in Delaware, agents arrested him. Hall told them that Lavenant 
supplied him with cocaine that he distributed in Delaware and agreed to cooperate in the 
agents’ investigation of Lavenant. In a series of phone calls, Lavenant instructed Hall to 
deposit money for the cocaine in three bank accounts in the names of others. Hall 
deposited the money at bank branches located in Delaware and New Jersey. 
In May 2012, agents searched Lavenant’s California home pursuant to a search 
warrant based in part on information Hall provided. They discovered a telephone used to 
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communicate with Hall, documents associated with the three bank accounts, and 
paraphernalia used to package cocaine. 
A federal grand jury in Delaware indicted Lavenant on one count of conspiracy to 
distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, 
and one count of distribution of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. After being 
arrested in and extradited from California, the grand jury issued a superseding indictment 
that added three counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1956.  
The District Court granted Lavenant’s request to represent himself. He filed two 
motions to dismiss the superseding indictment, a motion to suppress the evidence 
discovered as a result of the search of his home, and a motion for a hearing pursuant to 
Franks v. Delaware.1 The District Court denied the motions. The District Court also 
dismissed the second distribution of cocaine charge without prejudice for lack of venue in 
Delaware.  
A jury found Lavenant guilty of the remaining four charges. After a two-day 
sentencing hearing, the District Court sentenced Lavenant to 293 months of incarceration. 
Lavenant filed a timely appeal.2 
                                              
1 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
2 Although we appointed counsel to represent Lavenant in this appeal, Lavenant 
requested to proceed pro se and waived counsel. Accordingly, we granted his request to 
proceed pro se. 
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II. 
Having construed his pro se brief liberally, we find that Lavenant challenges his 
conviction and sentence on four grounds. First, he argues that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction over his case and that venue was not proper in the District of Delaware. 
Second, he argues that the superseding indictment was improper. Third, he argues that the 
search warrant for his California home was not supported by probable cause and was not 
properly issued. And finally, he argues that his sentence of 293 months of incarceration 
violates his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and is unreasonable.3 We address each 
argument in turn. 
A. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this criminal prosecution, and based on 
the evidence produced at trial, venue was proper for each of the charges in the District of 
Delaware.4 
Title 18 United States Code section 3231 gives district courts original jurisdiction 
over criminal prosecutions for violations of federal law. Because Lavenant was indicted 
                                              
3 At times, Lavenant’s brief refers to trial rulings and the admission of certain 
evidence as improper. However, he does not specifically identify which rulings he thinks 
were improper and presents no explanation as to why they were improper. “[A] passing 
reference to an issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue before this [C]ourt.” 
Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 
398 (3d Cir. 1994) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
4 We review questions of jurisdiction and venue de novo. See United States v. 
Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 532 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Best, 304 F.3d 308, 311 
(3d Cir. 2002). We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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for violating federal drug trafficking and money laundering statutes, the District Court 
had jurisdiction over the charges. 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 requires that a trial take place in the district 
where the alleged offense was committed. Title 18 United States Code section 3237(a) 
allows a trial for a continuing offense to take place “in any district in which such offense 
was begun, continued, or completed.” For conspiracy, “venue can be established 
wherever a co-conspirator has committed an act in furtherance of the conspiracy.”5 When 
venue is materially disputed, the Government must prove venue to the jury by a 
preponderance of the evidence.6 
For the conspiracy charge, Hall contacted the cooperating source in Delaware to 
arrange for the truck with a hidden compartment to be sent to San Diego. Lavenant also 
communicated with Hall in Delaware about distributing cocaine there, and Hall 
distributed cocaine he received from Lavenant in Delaware. And for the money 
laundering charges, Hall deposited money in Delaware into the bank accounts Lavenant 
identified. These facts were sufficient for the jury to conclude that venue was proper in 
the District of Delaware. 
B. 
Lavenant’s second argument is that the District Court should have dismissed the 
superseding indictment because it changed the charges against him without having been 
                                              
5 United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 329 (3d Cir. 2002). 
6 Id. at 334. 
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resubmitted to the grand jury.7 He claims that only an Assistant United States Attorney 
signed the superseding indictment, not the grand jury foreperson. This argument loses. 
The grand jury issued the superseding indictment. The copy of the superseding 
indictment in the appendices the parties submitted on appeal lacks the grand jury 
foreperson’s signature because it is redacted to protect the foreperson’s identity.8 The 
unredacted version of the superseding indictment—which is on file with the District 
Court as Docket Entry 37 but not publicly available—bears the foreperson’s signature. In 
addition to being properly issued, the superseding indictment adequately pled the charges 
and otherwise provided Lavenant with fair notice of the charges against him.9 Thus, we 
will affirm the District Court’s decision not to dismiss the superseding indictment. 
C. 
Lavenant next brings a variety of challenges to the search warrant that agents 
executed at his home.10 He says that the Government forged the Magistrate Judge’s 
signature on the warrant, that the warrant was an improper general warrant, and that the 
warrant was not supported by probable cause. None of these arguments has merit. 
                                              
7 We review challenges to an indictment de novo. See United States v. Werme, 939 
F.2d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1991). 
8 See Supp. App. at 23. 
9 Werme, 939 F.2d at 112. 
10 In reviewing the District Court’s denial of the motion to suppress, we review its 
legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See United States v. 
Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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First, no one forged the Magistrate Judge’s signature on the search warrant. 
Lavenant’s basis for this argument is that the signature that appears on the search warrant 
is different from the initials of the Magistrate Judge on a later order rejecting one of 
Lavenant’s filings.11 As the District Court stated, this discrepancy is of no legal import. 
The order rejecting Lavenant’s filing was signed by one of the Judge’s staff members 
with the authority to do so. The staff member placed the Judge’s initials in the area of the 
order marked, “Chambers Of:” to indicate which judge was issuing the order.12 The 
Judge’s signature on the search warrant was authentic and not forged. 
Second, the warrant was not an improper general warrant. The warrant refers to an 
Attachment A to describe the premises to be searched and an Attachment B to describe 
the things to be seized.13 Attachment A adequately describes Lavenant’s home, and 
Attachment B adequately describes the things to be seized: narcotics, proceeds from the 
sale of narcotics, firearms, financial records, and communication devices.14 Therefore, the 
warrant “particularly describ[ed] the place to be searched, and the . . . things to be 
seized.”15 
Third, the search warrant was supported by probable cause. A warrant may not 
issue without probable cause that the place to be searched contains a person or items that 
                                              
11 Compare Supp. App. at 432 (search warrant), with Dist. Ct. Dkt. Entry 45 at 4 
(later order). 
12 Dist. Ct. Dkt. Entry 45 at 4. 
13 Supp. App. at 432. 
14 Supp. App. at 429-31. 
15 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
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may be seized.16 A court reviewing a magistrate judge’s finding that such probable cause 
existed must give “great deference” to that finding; we must ensure only that the 
Magistrate Judge had a “substantial basis” to find that probable cause existed.17 The 
affidavit submitted with the warrant application gave the Magistrate Judge a substantial 
basis to find probable cause in this case. The affidavit detailed Lavenant and Hall loading 
the truck with cocaine in San Diego, phone calls and other contacts between Lavenant 
and Hall, and cash deposits to bank accounts Lavenant identified.18 Accordingly, we will 
affirm the District Court’s denial of the motion to suppress. 
D. 
Finally, Lavenant challenges his sentence of 293 months of incarceration on 
constitutional and reasonableness grounds.19 Lavenant first argues that the District Court 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial when it found certain facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence at his sentencing. He also argues that his sentence is an 
abuse of discretion. 
The District Court did not violate Lavenant’s right to a jury trial by finding certain 
facts at his sentencing. The Sixth Amendment requires that any fact that increases the 
                                              
16 Id. 
17 United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1205 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation 
marks and emphasis omitted). 
18 Supp. App. at 425-27. 
19 We review constitutional challenges to a sentence de novo and challenges to the 
procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. See 
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc); United States v. 
Lennon, 372 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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statutory maximum or minimum sentence a defendant may receive be proven to the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.20 Here, the jury found that Lavenant conspired to possess 
with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. This set the minimum 
sentence of incarceration Lavenant could receive at 120 months and the maximum at 
life.21 Once the maximum and minimum sentences were established, the District Court 
could find facts pursuant to the advisory Sentencing Guidelines to determine an 
appropriate sentence.22 The facts that Lavenant complains about were used to calculate 
the advisory Guidelines range. This did not violate Lavenant’s right to a jury trial. 
Lavenant’s sentence is also procedurally and substantively reasonable. As required 
by our precedent, the District Court first calculated the Guidelines range.23 After taking 
evidence at the sentencing hearing, the District Court found that Lavenant was 
responsible for more than 50 kilograms of cocaine and that the defendant possessed a 
firearm in relation to the offense. These facts are not clearly erroneous, and together they 
                                              
20 See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2013). 
21 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Lavenant’s convictions for money laundering carried 
no mandatory minimum sentence and a maximum sentence of 240 months. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1956(a)(3). Lavenant was sentenced to 120 months on each of those convictions, to run 
concurrently with his sentence for the conspiracy charge; the money laundering sentences 
complied with the Sixth Amendment. 
22 See United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 568 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
23 See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. 
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set Lavenant’s offense level at 38.24 With a criminal history score of zero, Lavenant’s 
advisory Guidelines range was 235 to 293 months of incarceration. The District Court 
then heard the parties’ arguments, considered all of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a), and imposed a sentence it believed was appropriate.25 Thus, Lavenant’s 
sentence was procedurally reasonable. Additionally, considering the totality of the 
circumstances, we find the sentence of 293 months of incarceration to be substantively 
reasonable.26 In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we must affirm 
“unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that 
particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”27 Here, the magnitude of 
the cocaine and money involved warranted such a high sentence. 
III. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm Lavenant’s judgment of conviction 
and sentence. 
                                              
24 See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2) (2012) (setting a base offense level of 36 for 
between 50 and 150 kilograms of cocaine); id. § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2012) (establishing a two 
level increase for possessing a firearm). Lavenant was sentenced using the 2012 version 
of the Sentencing Guidelines. 
25 See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 568. 
